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INTRODUCTION
Stunned commentators frantically responded to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Medellín v. Texas in the hours following the
opinion's release on March 25, 2008.1 In the coming years, experts
will debate extensively the significance of Medellín and what it
means for treaty interpretation.2 Although the Supreme Court created

1. See
Posting
of
Lyle
Denniston
to
SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/states-win-over-president-on-criminal-law-issue/
(Mar. 25, 2008, 10:10 EST) (providing an initial forum for responses to the Court’s
controversial decision); Posting of Steve Vladeck to Opinio Juris,
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206467533.shtml (Mar. 25, 2008, 13:52 EST)
(expressing consternation at an interpretation of treaties that seems “thoroughly at
odds” with the traditional reading of the Supremacy Clause).
2. See Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984, slip op. at 13 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (worrying that the Supreme Court has set up irrevocable
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a myriad of questions in its decision, it is safe to conclude that it
avoided the truly interesting question before it.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(“VCCR”), a treaty signed by the United States, requires that a
country hosting a foreign national who is arrested give the prisoner
the option to inform his or her own country of the arrest.3 The
Optional Protocol to the VCCR, also entered into by the United
States, provides for compulsory jurisdiction of all disputes arising
out of the VCCR in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).4 The
2004 ICJ decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, requiring
review and reconsideration of fifty-one Mexican nationals who were
deprived of their Article 36 rights, came into stark conflict with
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a 2006 Supreme Court case rejecting the
abandonment of rules of procedural default to repair Article 36
violations and thus depriving the petitioner of his chance at review
and reconsideration.5 The Court in Medellín could have resolved the
conflict between the two cases, but instead Chief Justice Roberts
rested his decision for the majority on Article 94(1) of the U.N.
Charter, declaring it non-self-executing and removing the need to
reach the subsequent question.6

hurdles barring the domestic application of treaties previously presumed to be selfexecuting).
3. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963,
21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR] (dictating that authorities of
the receiving nation inform an arrested individual “without delay” of rights arising
out of the VCCR to contact and communicate with the consular officials of the
sending state).
4. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 169, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488 [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (providing
for the compulsory jurisdiction of all disputes arising out of the interpretation and
application of the VCCR in the ICJ).
5. Compare Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
128, ¶ 121 (Mar. 31) (concluding that the United States must “permit review and
reconsideration” of cases involving authorities’ wrongful acts of failing to notify
foreign nationals of their consular notification rights), with Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (emphasizing that ICJ decisions have no
binding force on subsequent ICJ cases, let alone on American courts).
6. See Medellín, slip op. at 12 (majority opinion) (reading the phrase
“undertakes to comply” with ICJ decisions, the language of the U.N. Charter, as
merely a future commitment by signatory states to take action to ensure
compliance).
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Though the Supreme Court avoided the conflict between SanchezLlamas and Avena, it did not resolve it. The question of how U.S.
courts should consider an ICJ opinion that renders judgment in
accordance with a self-executing or congressionally implemented
treaty remains undecided. Medellín itself implicitly acknowledges
three circumstances that could, and probably will, create a conflict
that requires the resolution of this question. First, Congress could
implement the U.N. Charter’s Article 94(1) through legislation.7
Second, the presumption against non-self-executing treaties asserted
in Medellín could prove unworkable to future courts, forcing the
Supreme Court to reverse its holding.8 Finally, a different treaty,
employing language more explicit than that contained in the U.N.
Charter, could create a presumption of self-execution and thus bind
U.S. courts to ICJ decisions with respect to that treaty.9
Since the Court in Medellín never addressed the appropriate
weight for ICJ decisions when a treaty is self-executing or
congressionally implemented, this Comment uses Medellín as a lens
and framework to argue that the Supreme Court still needs a test by
which to analyze binding ICJ decisions or decisions by other binding
international tribunals.10 While the Court in Medellín rendered this
question moot with respect to the VCCR, the VCCR continues to
provide the best opportunity to analyze the way in which the Court
7. See id. at 24 (inviting Congress to take action and implement any treaties,
including Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter, to give them domestic effect).
8. See id. at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (admitting that Article 94(1) does not
contain explicit language foreclosing the possibility of self-execution like some
other treaties requiring implementing measures).
9. See id. at 24 (majority opinion) (acknowledging the continuing existence of
both self-executing and non-self-executing treaties); id. at 8 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(referring the reader to Appendix A of his dissenting opinion, which sets out
twenty-nine instances of the Court holding or assuming that a treaty is selfexecuting); see also All Change?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2008, at 17
(suggesting that a new President could usher in such foreign policy changes as the
United States joining the International Criminal Court); David Scheffer, For Love
of Country and International Criminal Law: Further Reflections, 24 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (pleading for the United States to have the courage to
join the host of other nations submitting to the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court).
10. See generally Julian Ku, International Delegations and the New World
Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24-41 (2006) (suggesting that due to the
growing number of international tribunal judgments, a decision regarding their
enforceability seems inevitable).

GREFFENIUS PROOFED.DOC

2008]

6/8/2008 5:25:56 PM

SELLING MEDELLÍN

947

should resolve this issue precisely because it has been interpreted by
both the ICJ in Avena and by the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas.
This Comment thus uses the VCCR to argue that when the Supreme
Court has an opportunity to revisit this issue, it should acknowledge
that ICJ decisions have binding effect insofar as they analyze and
interpret a particular treaty, but that the ICJ in Avena departed from
its authority when it contemplated changes in state procedural rules.
Part I summarizes the recent ICJ decisions concerning the VCCR and
Supreme Court cases that have considered their weight. Part II
argues that ICJ decisions, when given authority under a binding
treaty, are controlling on U.S. courts as to their interpretation of that
treaty. Part III recommends that the Supreme Court adopt an
international Erie doctrine, whereby supranational courts have
binding authority only regarding limited questions of international
substantive law, but not as to procedural impacts in the United
States.

I. BACKGROUND
The VCCR is a multi-lateral treaty, entered into by 170
countries,11 intended to govern the consular relations among those
countries.12 Article 36, relating to consular notification, has given
rise to contentious litigation in the United States.13 The following
discussion outlines Article 36 and the subsequent cases, both in the
ICJ and the U.S. Supreme Court. It also introduces Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins in order to lay the groundwork for a discussion more fully
developed in Parts II and III.

11. Michael E. Keasler, Criminal Procedure: Confessions, Searches, and
Seizures, 59 SMU L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2006).
12. See VCCR, supra note 3, pmbl. (stating that a goal of the treaty is to ensure
that countries observe privileges and immunities in order to improve relations
among the sovereign countries).
13. See Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to
Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91
Cal. L. Rev. 1729, 1736-37 (2003) (tracing the history of claims brought in U.S.
courts due to alleged violations of the VCCR and asserting that courts have not
adequately addressed the substantive issues of plaintiffs with Article 36 claims).
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A. ARTICLE 36 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
RELATIONS AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
The VCCR concerns nations’ respective rights with other
nations.14 In 1969, the Senate ratified the VCCR by a two-thirds
majority and presumably incorporated it into federal law through the
Supremacy Clause.15 The decision in Medellín did not directly
address the matter of self-execution of the VCCR; instead it declared
that the U.N. Charter, which requires that member states undertake to
comply with ICJ decisions, was not self-executing.16 Until Medellín,
most authorities regarded the VCCR as a self-executing treaty,
meaning that Congress did not need to take implementing
measures.17 Because of the unexpected ruling in Medellín on Article
94(1), the status of other treaties that scholars assumed were selfexecuting, such as the VCCR, is now in doubt.18 Medellín also left

14. See VCCR, supra note 3, pmbl. (opening the treaty by underscoring the
importance and necessity of promoting “friendly relations among nations” and
creating a community of interaction).
15. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“Ratified treaties become the law of the land on an equal footing with federal
statutes.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)).
16. See Medellín, slip op. at 12 (majority opinion) (premising its rejection of
Medellín’s request for rehearing on the interpretation that the U.N. Charter made
no binding promises about the enforceability of ICJ decisions).
17. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J.
concurring) (stating that the treaty is a self-executing treaty because it confers
“rights to individuals rather than merely setting out the obligations of signatories”);
Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that both
parties to the litigation agree that the VCCR is self-executing in the sense that it
does not require any implementing legislation to become federal law); Mark J.
Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for
the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 588 n.147 (1997) (citing
governmental officials’ statements referring to the VCCR as “entirely selfexecutive”); Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular
Notification and Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 27, 40-42 (2000) (citing several cases concluding that Article 36
conferred judicially enforceable rights and commenting that this conclusion
appears logical since the construction of Article 36 sets out not merely the
obligations of the signatories, but also mandatory, unequivocal recognition of the
importance of consular access to those detained by foreign governments).
18. See Medellín, slip op. at 5-10 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (tracing the history of
the understanding of treaties’ incorporation into federal law through the
Supremacy Clause and exhibiting confusion over the Court’s majority opinion
declaring Article 94(1) as non-self-executing).

GREFFENIUS PROOFED.DOC

2008]

6/8/2008 5:25:56 PM

SELLING MEDELLÍN

949

open the question of whether an individual can actually bring a
VCCR claim.19
Though the treaty touches on many international relations issues,
Article 36 embodies the controversial elements of the treaty.20 Article
36 provides that when a state arrests a foreign national, it has an
obligation to notify the consular authorities of the prisoner’s state.21
The treaty requires notification “without delay,” but neglects to
define exactly how much time may pass before the receiving state
must notify the sending state.22 Because of the ambiguity of the term,
this issue has been the subject of litigation itself, specifically as a
sub-issue within the Avena case.23 Despite the VCCR’s assurances,
almost no foreign nationals arrested in the United States actually
receive notification of their VCCR rights.24 These violations by the
19. See id. at 10 n.4 (majority opinion) (continuing the Sanchez-Llamas
assumption that the VCCR provides an individual right of action).
20. See, e.g., Adrienne M. Tranel, Comment, The Ruling of International Court
of Justice in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals: Enforcing the Right to Consular
Assistance in U.S. Jurisprudence, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 403, 414-30 (2005)
(outlining the cases, both in the ICJ and in domestic courts, concerning Article 36
rights and displaying the breadth of litigation on the issue); see also Jehanne
Henry, Comment, Overcoming Federalism in Internationalized Death Penalty
Cases, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459, 460 (2000) (pointing out the prevalence of Article
36 litigation and noting that “at least two-thirds of foreign nationals executed since
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976 unsuccessfully raised [Article 36
violations]”).
21. See VCCR, supra note 3, art. 36(1)(b) (asserting that, in order for the
sending state to perform consular functions, the receiving state must notify the
authorities of the sending state “without delay”).
22. See generally id. art. 1 (defining various terms for the Convention).
23. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶¶ 87-88 (determining that “without delay”
does not necessarily mean immediately, but rather as soon as the arresting party
realizes, or has grounds to realize, that the arrested individual is a foreign national).
24. See Susan McClelland, Human Rights Violations in the United
States: Amnesty International Reports on Unfair Trial Procedures and
Mistreatments of Inmates in the American Prison System, PEACE MAG., Mar.-Apr.
1999, at 23, available at http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v15n2p23a.htm (noting
that Amnesty International officials say that in “virtually every instance,” foreign
nationals on death row have had their Article 36 rights denied). But see U.S. State
Department, Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal, State, and
Other Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in
the United States and the Right of Consular Officials to Assist Them,
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_636.html (last visited May 15, 2008)
(showing efforts by the federal government to increase the compliance with U.S.
obligations under the VCCR by informing state and local law enforcement of their
duties under the treaty).
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United States have led to the recent glut of VCCR litigation, both in
U.S. courts and in the ICJ.25
The Optional Protocol to the VCCR assigns jurisdiction over
disputes arising under the VCCR to the ICJ.26 This grant of
adjudicatory power has created conflicts between Supreme Court
precedent and ICJ decisions.27 It is unclear at this early date whether
Congress or a future Court will decide to recognize Article 94(1) of
the U.N. Charter as a part of federal law, and thus invoke the ICJ as a
binding tribunal. If either Congress or the Court, however, remove
this impediment, the issues discussed below will resurface. Partly
because of this conflict, the United States has subsequently
withdrawn from the Optional Protocol.28

B. THE ICJ EXAMINES U.S. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36:
THE BREARD AND LAGRAND CASES
Prior to Avena, the ICJ examined two cases involving United
States violations of Article 36.29 Paraguay’s Article 36 claim in the
Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
25. See, e.g., Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703, 709 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)
(addressing the petitioner’s contentions of a VCCR violation and following Breard
as relevant precedent to deny the petitioner’s appeal to the court to ignore the rule
of procedural default); see also infra notes 29-67 and accompanying text (relating
the facts and legal issues in the landmark VCCR cases and Article 36 litigation in
the United States and abroad).
26. See Optional Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1; see also Camille Cancio,
Comment, The United States’ International Obligations and the Impact on
Federalism: Medellín v. Dretke and the Force of Avena in American Courts, 27
WHITTIER L. REV. 1047, 1052 (2006) (noting that, in the past, the United States
argued for the binding effect of ICJ decisions and in fact, was the first to invoke
the Optional Protocol to use the ICJ as a forum for the resolution of the Iranian
hostage crisis).
27. Compare Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2674 (holding that the VCCR does
not require suppression or review of a case as a remedy for a violation), with
Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 143 (holding that the clemency process did not, as the
United States contended, constitute compliance with the ICJ decision in LaGrand).
28. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 2005, at A1.
29. See Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay, Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99, ¶¶ 2.31-2.33 (Oct. 9) (seeking
order of provisional measures for the violation of a Paraguayan citizen’s Article 36
rights); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 12 (June 27) (continuing
the ICJ litigation against the United States even though the United States executed
the LaGrand brothers before the ICJ had an opportunity to announce its opinion).
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(Paraguay v. United States) arose from an incident in Virginia in
which the state charged Angel Breard with capital murder and
sentenced him to death.30 Police never informed Breard of his right to
consular notification.31 Breard finally raised the issue of the Article
36 violation in his habeas corpus petition—four years after his
arrest.32 Shortly before Breard’s scheduled execution, when his
habeas relief seemed doubtful, Paraguay instituted an action against
the United States in the ICJ.33 The ICJ, acting in only six days, issued
a provisional measure, unanimously deciding that the United States
must do everything in its power to stay Breard’s execution.34
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court decided that the ICJ’s
provisional measure did not trump a forum state’s procedural rules.35
30. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (summarizing the
procedural and factual history, in which the State presented overwhelming
evidence that Breard committed the murder, a fact that he later confessed to during
trial).
31. See id. at 376-77 (assuming that the United States violated the VCCR); see
also Henry, supra note 20, at 464 (noting that the United States, throughout the
litigation, admitted that authorities violated the VCCR by not informing Breard of
his rights); Press Statement, James P. Rubin, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State
(Nov. 4, 1998), available at http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/editorials.htm
(admitting to the failure to notify Breard of his right to contact the Paraguayan
government, recognizing the obligation owed by the United States to Paraguay,
and apologizing for the violation of the obligation).
32. See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(explaining that Breard could not raise the issue of an Article 36 violation at this
point in the trial because the procedural default rule barred him from presenting
that claim in state court proceedings).
33. See Application of the Republic of Paraguay, Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426, ¶ 25 (Apr. 9), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/99/7183.pdf (requesting, among other things,
that the ICJ decide that the United States void any criminal liability imposed on
Breard).
34. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, ¶ 41 (Apr. 9), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/99/7599.pdf (indicating that, given Paraguay’s
showing of a United States violation, the only way to properly resolve the issues
presented was to order provisional measures to stay the execution of Breard); see
also Declaration of President Schwebel, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/99/7603.pdf (announcing the decision of the President of the
ICJ, an American, to vote for the provisional measure of April 9, 1998, despite his
belief that an issue of such great importance should be decided on its merits).
35. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (explaining that the only way in which a treaty
may trump state procedural rules is by a clear and express statement of intention in
the treaty).
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Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer argued in dissent that the Supreme
Court should grant a stay, allow the ICJ deliberations to progress,
and consider the case after giving the ICJ more time to fully consider
it.36 The Supreme Court, however, held that ICJ provisional measures
are not binding.37
In the LaGrand case, Arizona convicted two German brothers,
Walter and Karl LaGrand, for the death of a bank employee during a
bank robbery.38 Once again, as in Breard, no one informed the
brothers of their Article 36 rights.39 Germany unsuccessfully
attempted to stave off the impending execution through diplomatic
channels.40
When the ICJ considered the case, it emphasized that the United
States had a duty to abide by the binding decisions of the ICJ.41
Though the execution of the LaGrand brothers had already been
carried out, Germany, unlike Paraguay in Breard, did not withdraw

36. See id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the normal rules of
procedure for reviewing a habeas petition would give the Supreme Court
substantially more time, except in this case Virginia deprived the Court of that
time); id. at 380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that several issues, because of
their novelty and difficulty, “warrant less speedy consideration”).
37. See id. at 375 (explaining that while the Court would give “respectful
consideration” to an ICJ interpretation of a treaty, that interpretation would not
carry binding force).
38. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1257-61 (9th Cir. 1998)
(summarizing the facts and procedure surrounding the botched bank robbery by the
LaGrands).
39. See id. at 1261 (“It is undisputed that the State of Arizona did not notify the
LaGrands of their rights under the [VCCR].”).
40. See Daniel A. McFaul, Jr., Recent Decisions, Germany v. United States,
2001 I.C.J. 104, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 119, 121 (2002) (describing the various
rejected appeals for clemency made by Germany to the State of Arizona followed
by proceedings in the Supreme Court by both Germany and Walter LaGrand in
which the Supreme Court ruled negatively for both parties).
41. See Tranel, supra note 20, at 419 (describing the three relevant holdings of
the ICJ in LaGrand as “(1) the duty to comply with the individual rights
enumerated in Article 36; (2) the duty to carry out those rights in a meaningful
way; and (3) the duty to abide by the binding decisions and provisional measures
of the ICJ”); see also Note, Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S.
States Beyond the Reach of the Law of Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654, 2654
(2003) (describing the ICJ’s decision in LaGrand as particularly noteworthy
because of its announcement that parties must submit to provisional orders, despite
their similarities to mere preliminary injunctions).
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its request for a decision, allowing ICJ to rule on the merits.42 In its
decision, the ICJ ruled that the United States must grant “review and
reconsideration” to those defendants uninformed of their Article 36
rights.43

C. AVENA AND MEDELLÍN
In the wake of Breard and LaGrand, Mexico brought suit against
the United States in the ICJ, alleging violations of the VCCR.44 In
Avena, Mexico sought, among other things, to have the convictions
partially or totally annulled,45 to receive a declaration from the ICJ
that the rights the VCCR constitute “human right[s],”46 and to
prevent the United States from applying rules of procedural default

42. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 128 (addressing each of the issues before
the court, including the violation by the United States against the LaGrand brothers
and the United States’ duty to, in the future, grant review and reconsideration).
43. See id. ¶ 125 (deciding to impose a “review and reconsideration”
requirement, but explicitly leaving the means of implementation up to the United
States); see also Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United
States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 427, 432 (2002) (discussing the
ICJ’s decision to leave “review and reconsideration” broad in order to allow the
United States, and other nations applying the principal, room to tailor the method
used). But see Jeremy White, A New Remedy Stresses the Need for International
Education: The Impact of the LaGrand Case on a Domestic Court’s Violation of a
Foreign National’s Consular Relations Right Under the Vienna Convention, 2
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 295, 309-12 (2003) (explaining that, though the
United States has room to adopt appropriate implementing measures, it
nevertheless must undertake to comply, especially in light of its increasingly poor
reputation in international compliance).
44. See Application of Mexico to Institute Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003
I.C.J. 128, ¶ 1 (Jan. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files
/128/1913.pdf (accusing the United States of detaining, convicting, and sentencing
to death fifty-four Mexican nationals all without any notification of their Article 36
rights).
45. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶¶ 116-117 (arguing that restitutio in integrum
is the proper remedy for “an internationally wrongful act”).
46. See id. ¶ 124 (summarizing Mexico’s contention that the right to consular
notification is a fundamental right such that its infringement calls into question the
entire subsequent judicial process); see also Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The
Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees
of the Due Process of Law, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16 ¶ 141 (1999)
(advising that Article 36 is a human right).
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in cases where the application might preclude review of possible
violations of the VCCR.47
In February of 2003, the ICJ issued a provisional order mandating
that the United States take all action necessary to prevent the
execution of the fifty-one Mexican nationals.48 In its final action,
Mexico requested that the ICJ expand on its LaGrand decision,
which required merely “review and reconsideration,” and instead
sought an ICJ judgment for a stronger, more decisive remedy.49 In its
final judgment, the ICJ balked at this step, but enunciated that the
United States could not achieve review and reconsideration through
the clemency process,50 nor could it employ rules of procedural
default to bar such review and reconsideration.51
In 2001, Medellín, one of the fifty-one Mexican nationals at issue
in Avena, filed a writ of habeas corpus to protest the Article 36
violation.52 In 2006, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals heard and
dismissed Medellín’s claim of an Article 36 violation as procedurally
barred.53 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that Article 94(1) of
47. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, International Decision, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
126 S.Ct. 2669, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 882, 887 (2006) (explaining that despite
Avena’s ruling, the Court has made clear that international law must still conform
to state procedural and remedial doctrines).
48. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128,
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Order of Feb. 5, 2003, ¶¶ 36,
59 (mirroring the findings of the prior LaGrand case in ordering that the United
States abstain from action).
49. See Tranel, supra note 20, at 425, 426 n.100 (highlighting the request of
Mexico for restitutio in integrum as opposed to the United States’ position of
maintaining the LaGrand decision and only requiring review and reconsideration).
50. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 143 (noting the insufficiency of the clemency
process to meet the requirements of review and reconsideration laid out by
LaGrand).
51. See id. ¶ 112 (explaining the difference between the procedural default rule
as a general rule of law, which does not contravene the requirements of the VCCR,
and the procedural default rule as applied to the cases in Avena, in which it does
violate the VCCR).
52. See Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(explaining that Medellín had raised his VCCR Article 36 claim for the first time
in his application for a writ of habeas corpus).
53. See id. at 332 (determining that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is
bound by the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Breard and Sanchez-Llamas).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also determined that a memorandum from
President Bush to the Attorney General ordering Texas to give effect to Avena
exceeded his power. Id. at 348.
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the U.N. Charter merely embodied a promise to take future action,
not an immediately domestically enforceable commitment, and
affirmed the Texas court’s opinion.54

D. SANCHEZ-LLAMAS AND THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ICJ
For purposes of this Comment’s analysis, Sanchez-Llamas
provides further background because it examines the implications of
a treaty if it were self-executing.55 The Supreme Court decided
Sanchez-Llamas, a case in which neither of the defendants were
beneficiaries of the ICJ’s decision, in the wake of the Avena
decision.56 The case actually combined two lower court cases that
barred remedies for Article 36 violations; one of the petitioners—
Bustillo—requested that courts bar the application of procedural
default as contemplated in Avena, the other—Sanchez-Llamas—
attempted to convince the Court that it should adopt suppression of
evidence as a remedy for Article 36 violations,57 The Supreme Court
found no reason to think that any signatory country to the VCCR
contemplated that the suppression of evidence would serve as a
remedy and rejected his contention.58 However, the ICJ did not
discuss suppression as an appropriate remedy in its various Article
36 cases, so the Supreme Court did not confront the issue of

54. Medellín, slip op. at 12 (majority opinion).
55. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2680 (assuming that the VCCR is selfexecuting and thus asserting that, had it provided for an appropriate remedy, a U.S.
court would have no trouble in enforcing that remedy). But see Medellín, slip op. at
12 (majority opinion) (declaring the U.N. Charter unenforceable domestically
because of its non-self-execution).
56. See Linda Greenhouse, Treaty Doesn’t Give Foreign Defendants Special
Status in U.S. Courts, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A22 (discussing
relevance of Sanchez-Llamas and the struggle the Supreme Court has faced as the
ICJ has increased its role in asserting individual rights to consular notification).
57. See generally Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2674-77 (describing the facts
surrounding both petitioners Sanchez-Llamas’ and Bustillo’s cases).
58. See id. at 2678 n.3 (explaining that the only country that regularly excluded
evidence obtained absent consular notification was Brazil, a country which found
that its constitution, and not just the VCCR, conferred the right to consular
notification); see also, Keasler, supra note 11, at 1174 (arguing that since failing to
inform a foreign national of his or her consular rights rarely elicits a faulty
confession or benefits police, suppression as a remedy would be vastly
disproportionate to the violation).

GREFFENIUS PROOFED.DOC

956

6/8/2008 5:25:56 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[23:943

precedential weight afforded ICJ decisions with regard to SanchezLlamas’ claim.59
Bustillo, on the other hand, claimed that the United States violated
his rights under the VCCR via the application of the procedural
default rule, just as the fifty-one Mexican nationals in Avena did.60
As the Supreme Court pointed out, Sanchez-Llamas did not present
the first case of someone attempting to set aside rules of procedural
default in an Article 36 violation case.61 Bustillo attempted to
persuade the Court to modify its prior holding in Breard by
presenting the recent decisions of the ICJ in LaGrand and Avena as
subsequent precedent.62 Those supporting Bustillo argued that “the
United States is obligated to comply with the [VCCR], as interpreted
by the ICJ.”63
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected this contention for three
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has ultimate power to “say what
the law is.”64 Second, the Optional Protocol expressly limits the
binding force of ICJ decisions to parties before the tribunal.65 The
Supreme Court noted that the primary purpose of the ICJ is simply to
“arbitrate particular disputes.”66 Finally, the Supreme Court found
the ICJ decision contrary to the United States’ adversarial system,
59. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2678-82 (discussing only interpretations
of Article 36’s effect regarding possible remedies rather than discussing any ICJ
ruling).
60. See id. at 2682 (outlining the general rule which bars a defendant from
raising a claim on collateral appeal if the defendant failed to raise that claim on
direct appeal).
61. See id. (citing Breard and its attempt to analogize potential VCCR rights to
sacredly protected constitutional rights, which the Supreme Court points out are
also subject to procedural default).
62. See id. at 2683 (acknowledging the complicated issues associated with
using LaGrand and Avena as subsequent precedent).
63. Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 11, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 0410566, 05-51), available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/
ICJExpertsAmicusBrief.pdf.
64. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (invoking Marbury v. Madison as
authority to ignore any contrary ICJ ruling).
65. See id. (noting that cases in the ICJ do not even serve as binding precedent
on subsequent ICJ decisions, let alone U.S. courts).
66. See id. (arguing that the ICJ by its very nature “contemplates
quintessentially international remedies,” and by extension not domestic remedies,
impliedly precluding the ICJ’s intrusion into state proceedings).
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impermissibly contradicting not only procedural fixtures such as the
procedural default rule, but also other procedural mandates in U.S.
courts.67

E. ERIE AND ITS EFFECT ON AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
At first blush, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins appears to bear little
relation to Medellín or provide little possibility for insight into
analyzing the effect of ICJ decisions on domestic cases. However,
analysts of Erie have acknowledged that pre-Erie federal courts’
application of federal general common law bears resemblances to
modern federal courts’ application of customary international law.68
This Comment employs similar analyses used by the Erie Court in
the context of international decisions, and thus review of Erie and its
landmark significance will provide helpful background.
Erie involved a diversity suit by Tompkins, a citizen of
Pennsylvania, brought against a railroad company based in New
York, for an injury that Tompkins sustained by a passing train that
hit him while he walked along a railroad track.69 Before Erie, Swift v.
Tyson allowed federal courts hearing diversity cases to apply federal
general common law if the state had no applicable statutory
provision governing the situation.70 Erie overturned Swift and
established a new framework, commanding federal courts to abandon
federal general common law, and instead apply the applicable state
common law.71 Erie itself illustrates the problem with the Swift
67. See id. at 2686 (concluding that the ICJ interpretation “sweeps too
broadly”). The Court also notes that to allow such an interpretation would mean
that giving the VCCR “full effect” essentially precludes any requirement that that
full effect be in conformity with the laws of the receiving State, a mandate also
prescribed by the VCCR. Id.
68. Phillip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939) (examining Erie’s
applicability to international law).
69. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938).
70. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842) (interpreting the Rules of
Decision Act to command federal courts to apply state statutory law and
interpretations of that law, but that “[i]t never has been supposed by us, that the
[Rules of Decision Act] did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more
general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes . . .”).
71. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80 (overruling Swift as an “unconstitutional
assumption of powers” by federal courts to decide questions of substantive state
law).
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doctrine: under Swift, if Tompkins brought his suit in Pennsylvania
state court, he would have lost, but by bringing it in New York
federal court, he had a chance (which proved successful at the trial
level) to recover damages if that court adopted a different rule than
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.72
Concurring in Erie, Justice Reed famously noted that “[t]he line
between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts
federal power over procedure.”73 Though this comment proved true,
in the years that followed the Court grappled with defining the
substance-procedure distinction precisely.74 Delving into the
intricacies of this distinction is beyond this Comment’s scope, but
the Erie doctrine nevertheless illustrates that a substance-procedure
distinction is a workable basis for establishing what rules of law a
court must follow in the international arena.

II. ANALYSIS
Prior to the Court’s decision in Medellín, legal scholars speculated
as to how the Supreme Court should handle the case.75 Many writers
did not seem completely satisfied with the prospect of a ruling either
for Medellín or for rejection of a remedy on his behalf.76 By deciding
72. See id. at 74-75 (discussing several problems associated with the Swift
doctrine, including the reality that the non-citizens, bringing a diversity suit, had
the privilege of choosing different, unwritten laws by virtue of their option of
where to bring a suit); see also Armistead Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v.
Tyson, 35 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 329, 329 (1930) (entreating that someday Swift “may
also find itself in the Wordsworthian limbo of ‘old unhappy far off things, And
battles long ago’”).
73. 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
74. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (agreeing, in
principle, that federal courts have power over procedure, but explaining that
substance and procedure are not separated by any “great divide”); see also Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468-71 (1965) (discussing situations in which a Federal
Rule of Procedure may have an outcome-determinative effect, and deciding that as
long as a Rule is a legitimate extension of the Enabling Act and the Constitution, it
still regulates procedure regardless of the outcome-determinative effect).
75. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Looking Ahead: October Term 2007, CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 2006-2007, at 335, 342 (describing the nature of the legal questions
in Medellín and the likelihood of a multitude of opinions from the justices).
76. See
Posting
of
Lyle
Denniston
to
SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/analysis-how-to-say-no-to-the-president/
(Oct. 10, 2007, 14:19 EST) (providing a forum for others to discuss their thoughts
on the Medellín oral arguments, viewed by some people as leading to two equally
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the case on a theory of non-self-execution, the Court temporarily
avoided reconciling these concerns. The discomfort that scholars
exhibited prior to the decision in Medellín, however, goes towards a
deeper concern over how to treat decisions by the ICJ and similar
courts when those decisions appear to dictate certain domestic
behavior.77

A. HISTORICALLY, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS ACCORDED
ICJ DECISIONS SOME WEIGHT, DESPITE THE COURT’S PORTRAYAL
OF ITS PRIOR TREATMENT IN SANCHEZ-LLAMAS
The Supreme Court’s precedent establishes that U.S. courts should
give “respectful consideration” to ICJ decisions.78 In both Breard and
Sanchez-Llamas, however, the Supreme Court has, after very little
consideration, completely ignored ICJ interpretation.79 The Court

troubling possibilities: a foreign court has supremacy over the Supreme Court or, if
the Supreme Court rules the other way, the Supreme Court’s possible stripping of
the President’s and Congress’ powers to make effective and binding treaties).
77. See John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of
Treaty-Based Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 552, 564 (2006) (observing that
domestic VCCR litigation frequently raises the issue of a proper remedy for
violation of treaty rights); see also Michael Franck, Note, The Future of Judicial
Internationalism: Charming Betsy, Medellín v. Dretke, and the Consular Right
Dispute, 86 B.U.L. REV. 515, 519 (2006) (hoping incorrectly that part of the
importance of Medellín would lie in its confrontation of the contentiousness of
foreign precedent application in domestic law); discussion infra Part II.B
(explaining the significance of prior interpretations of foreign law as applied to
binding foreign precedent and discussing the correct application of the Supremacy
Clause as it relates to treaties).
78. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (positing the notion that “while we should give
respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by
an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been recognized in
international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that
State”); see also Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683 (agreeing that while
“respectful consideration” is the appropriate degree of deference for an ICJ
decision, that does not compel a particular result nor, in this case, require a
revision of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VCCR under Breard);
Medellín, slip op. at 17 n.9 (majority opinion) (affirming that the decision in
Medellín does not disrupt the “respectful consideration” standard first articulated in
Breard).
79. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (analyzing the VCCR provision, which allows
a signatory country to implement all obligations in conformity with its laws, and
determining that the provision supersedes any ICJ interpretation).
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only briefly considered “respectful consideration” in Medellín.80
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sanchez-Llamas emphasizes that, though
the Supreme Court apparently regards the use of ICJ decisions as
persuasive precedent with disdain,81 in fact the Supreme Court and
lower courts frequently turn to ICJ decisions for guidance.82 This
section analyzes the Supreme Court’s prior treatment of international
law generally and ICJ decisions specifically before proceeding to
analyze how the Supreme Court ignored these practices in SanchezLlamas.
1.

The Supreme Court Has Cited and Followed Several Foreign
Court and ICJ Decisions

The Supreme Court most famously relied on international
precedent in Lawrence v. Texas83 and Atkins v. Virginia.84 However,
the Supreme Court’s citations to ICJ decisions are more applicable to
this discussion.85 The Supreme Court has in the past cited to several
ICJ opinions, both to resolve territorial disputes,86 as well as to
80. See Medellín, slip op. at 17 n.9 (majority opinion) (explaining that since
“nothing suggests that the ICJ views its judgments as automatically enforceable in
the domestic courts . . . ,” there does not seem to be any need to afford respectful
consideration when determining the enforceability of ICJ decisions).
81. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (inferring
from the majority in Sanchez-Llamas that it overlooked the opinion of the ICJ by
viewing the interpretation as “clearly wrong”).
82. See id. at 2701-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (presenting an impressive list of
Supreme Court and lower court decisions citing ICJ decisions as authority).
83. See 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (explaining the deficiencies of Bowers v.
Hardwick by comparing it to a foreign case with similar facts where the domestic
law was considered invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights).
84. See 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (turning to foreign jurisdictions, as well
as the expert opinions of medical professionals, to examine whether the execution
of the mentally retarded qualifies as cruel and unusual for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment).
85. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2700 (arguing that the proposed weight
given to ICJ decisions, one of “respectful consideration,” acknowledges the fact
that the ICJ judges are respected experts in issues of treaty interpretation); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 103 cmt. b
(1986) (proposing that since the ICJ gives significant weight to prior decisions,
though they are not bound by them, domestic courts can view its decisions as
representative of the state of international law and, accordingly, “[t]he judgments
and opinions of the International Court of Justice are accorded great weight”).
86. See United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 99 (1986) (approving the method
used by the ICJ in determining coastal boundary issues); United States v.
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evaluate the common international understanding of a legal term in
the context of a treaty.87 This growing wealth of citations by the
Supreme Court to international court decisions supports the notion
that the Court increasingly looks beyond the territorial boundaries of
the United States for guidance, especially when the Court confronts
issues pertaining to matters of international law.88
Many scholars, including some Supreme Court Justices,
vehemently oppose the use of foreign precedent.89 Noted
international law expert John Yoo, who argues fervently against
anything but “ornamental” use of international court decisions to
bolster domestic holdings, would likely argue that the Optional
Protocol itself, because of its usurpation of domestic judicial power,
violates the Constitution.90 However, looking to foreign countries’

Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 107 n.10 (1985) (describing the same ICJ case as
“noteworthy”); see also infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text (discussing the
charge of the Sanchez-Llamas majority that courts, with limited exceptions, only
cite to ICJ opinions concerning technical border disputes).
87. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 61 (1957) (using an ICJ decision as
guidance for what constitutes a “dispute” under international law). Significantly,
the Supreme Court in this case looked to the ICJ opinion to analyze how to
interpret a term within a treaty, just as the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas
looked at, and subsequently ignored in Medellín, the definition of giving “full
effect” to a person’s Article 36 rights. Id.
88. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Explaining the Role
of Foreign and International Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1389, 1392 (2007) (expressing a positive view towards the application of
international law in domestic courts, at least in the narrow analysis of cruel and
unusual punishment cases). But see John Yoo, Peeking Abroad?: The Supreme
Court’s Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 26 HAWAII L. REV.
385, 392 (2004) (arguing that deference to an international court in any way
amounts to the transfer of judicial power in a manner that violates the Constitution
and separation of powers doctrine). Mr. Yoo also argues that allowing this
deference forfeits any opportunity to retain accountability through the American
democratic process. Id.
89. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for looking to foreign precedent and arguing
for the total abandonment of the idea that the United States should conform to the
laws of other countries). But see Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress to Mind its
Own Business, WASH. POST, May 19, 2006, at A19 (explaining Scalia’s position
that, while he rejects the use of foreign precedent in U.S. decisions, the Supreme
Court should be free to do so if it chooses).
90. See Yoo, supra note 88, at 392 (noting that just as Congressional delegation
of duties to a coordinate branch of government is unconstitutional, so too is
delegation of judicial authority to an international adjudicatory body).
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established domestic law for guidance on American domestic law, a
practice U.S. courts already employ, is more radical than deferring to
the ICJ in certain circumstances given the ICJ’s expertise in
international law.91
2.

The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the ICJ’s Decision in Avena
Is Perfunctory and At Odds with Its Prior Practice

The language of the majority in Sanchez-Llamas seems fearful of
the concept of foreign influence in domestic jurisprudence.92
Furthermore, the majority in Sanchez-Llamas attempts to dismiss the
significance of Justice Breyer’s list of court cases relying on ICJ
decisions.93 The majority has two main arguments to rebut Justice
Breyer’s statement that the Court frequently relies on ICJ decisions:
first, that most of the decisions merely cite ICJ decisions, along with
law review articles, for general propositions about international
law;94 and second, that almost all of Justice Breyer’s cites concern
ICJ references for only technical boundary issues.95
Both of these criticisms are less impressive than they initially
appear. First, Justice Breyer does not contradict the majority’s
conclusion that the ICJ opinion in Avena is not binding, but instead
argues that ICJ interpretation of the VCCR, a document that the
Optional Protocol grants the ICJ jurisdiction over, be accorded some
91. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)
(referencing the ideas of an international scholar, Philip Jessup, and
acknowledging his subsequent position as an ICJ judge to implicitly give more
credence to his opinions regarding international law).
92. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683 n.4 (concluding with the comment
that the “‘respectful consideration’ of precedent should begin at home”); see also
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s
opinion and discourse on foreign precedent as “dangerous dicta,” because of its
potential to impose “foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans”). Justice
Scalia joined in the majority of Sanchez-Llamas. 126 S. Ct. at 2673.
93. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685 n.5 (observing that the dissent’s list
“is less impressive than [it] first appears” because many of the opinions cited in the
dissent do not rely on ICJ decisions but merely cite them, and also observing that
all but two of the cited decisions concern only “technical issues of boundary
demarcation”).
94. See id.; see also Yoo, supra note 88, at 387 (arguing that the citations of
international precedent by the Supreme Court may be merely “ornaments”
designed to make an opinion look more supported, when in fact such citations have
no impact on the outcome of a case).
95. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685 n.5.
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deference in U.S. courts.96 Thus, when decisions cite ICJ opinions
with approval, regardless of whether the citation appears near
citations to law review articles, courts have explicitly acknowledged
the persuasive weight of relevant ICJ decisions.97 In fact, as the
Sanchez-Llamas majority points out, ICJ opinions only bind the
litigants before the court in the specific dispute.98
In boundary dispute cases, the deciding court must make parallels
between the facts of the ICJ case and draw analogies to the case at
hand.99 By contrast, since the facts in Sanchez-Llamas mirror the
facts of the various ICJ decisions ruling on consular notification,
including Avena, the Court need not draw such analogies or make
such parallels.100 Second, the criticism fails to note that many ICJ
decisions, by their very nature, most frequently arbitrate technical
boundary disputes.101 Justice Breyer merely suggests, in cases
involving non-binding ICJ decisions that provide persuasive
authority, that the Supreme Court accord such decisions actual as

96. See id. at 2696 (clarifying the holding of the ICJ in Avena in order to show
that the Court in Sanchez-Llamas could have granted the purported “respectful
consideration” while still maintaining the validity of its prior holding in Breard).
97. See, e.g., Maine, 475 U.S. at 99-100 (approving of ICJ rationale); see also
supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing several cases in which the
Supreme Court relied on, to at least some degree, decisions by the ICJ).
98. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (admitting that the ICJ statute
makes ICJ decisions binding only on the particular parties in a particular case to
support the proposition that Avena was not binding on the parties currently before
the Supreme Court); Medellín, slip op. at 22 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the holding in Sanchez-Llamas has no relevance in this case because this case
involves a party whose case Mexico specifically advocated for in front of the ICJ,
and “[i]t is in respect to these individuals that the United States has promised the
ICJ decision will have binding force”).
99. See Maine, 475 U.S. at 99-100 (drawing an explicit comparison between
the method of boundary demarcation used in an ICJ case, an Indian case, and the
case at hand between Massachusetts and Maine).
100. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677-78 (discussing the procedural
history relating to Bustillo’s claim of an Article 36 violation).
101. See Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International
Court of Justice Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 434, 436-56 (2004) (reporting on
many of the ICJ cases in the last two decades, the vast majority of which concern
some form of border or territorial dispute); see also 2007 ICJ Docket,
http://www.uni.edu/ihsmun/resources/docket2007.pdf (displaying the cases under
consideration before the ICJ in 2007, all but one of which concern territorial
disputes).
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opposed to perfunctory consideration, and the above factors make
this approach more persuasive.102
While the majority in Sanchez-Llamas attempts to dismiss ICJ
decisions almost without a second thought,103 the Supreme Court
actually does a disservice to the precedent by doing so.104 First, the
Supreme Court has already relied on foreign court decisions to guide
its consideration of important constitutional issues.105 Second, though
the Supreme Court attempts to note the limited use of ICJ decisions
in past Supreme Court jurisprudence such prior usage required the
Court to draw more inferences than in VCCR cases such as Medellín.

B. THE ICJ DECISION IN AVENA REPRESENTS A BINDING DECISION
WITH RESPECT TO ITS INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Despite indications that the Supreme Court, by deciding Medellín,
would resolve the conflict between Sanchez-Llamas and Avena, the
Court avoided answering the questions facing it: whether the VCCR
provides an individual right of action and how to reconcile any

102. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2702 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (indicating
that the Supreme Court could give the ICJ decision its proper weight, but instead
the majority “overlooks what the ICJ actually said, overstates what it actually
meant, and is inconsistent with what it actually did”).
103. See id. at 2703 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asking how the Supreme Court can
purport to give an ICJ decision “respectful consideration,” when, in fact, it
misreads the ICJ decision and implies an “extreme rule of law.”). But see Margaret
McGuinness, Sanchez-Llamas, American Human Rights Exceptionalism and the
VCCR Norm Portal, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 47, 58-59 (2007) (suggesting that
because the Supreme Court stopped short of denying an individual right stemming
from the VCCR, Justice Roberts’ opinion was not such an “extreme rebuke of
internationalism” as many observers believe).
104. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2703 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that to show the appropriate respect to an ICJ decision, the Supreme Court must
“read the opinions in light of the Convention's underlying language and purposes
and ask whether, or to what extent, they require modification of a State's ordinary
procedural rules”).
105. See Yoo, supra note 88, at 386 (pointing out with disappointment that
Supreme Court citations to foreign court decisions may not be purely ornamental
because such ornamentation would not warrant the open hostility of those justices
opposed to the citations and because of the growing movement in academic
communities encouraging the Court to engage in a dialogue with foreign nations’
judicial systems).
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future, binding ICJ opinions with conflicting domestic law.106 The
ICJ decision in Avena, and to a lesser extent its decision in LaGrand,
directly contradict the Supreme Court’s holding in SanchezLlamas.107 Only the Supreme Court, at some point in the future, can
resolve this contradiction by overruling its decision in SanchezLlamas, recasting its explicit holding, or ignoring the decision of the
ICJ completely.108
In fact, the Court could resolve this conflict by adhering to the
precedent it established under Sanchez-Llamas while at the same
time remaining faithful to the United States’ commitments under
both the VCCR and the Optional Protocol.109 Because the Supreme
Court has historically recognized the authority of international
bodies, the Court’s own precedent dictates that it should not entirely
turn its back on the international community when, in the future, it
faces self-executing or congressionally implemented treaties.110
Rather, to maintain consistency with its own precedent in this
emerging body of case law, the Court could formulate its
106. See Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 672 (2005) (Ginsburg, J. concurring)
(foreseeing that the Supreme Court would eventually revisit Medellín after further
review by the Texas court); see also Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677 (asserting
that because the Court could decide the case on other grounds, it should refrain
from answering the question of whether the VCCR grants individually enforceable
rights).
107. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2687 (concluding that rules of
procedural default may bar a petitioner from raising a VCCR claim); see also
Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 113 (deciding that in certain cases the rule of procedural
default directly prevents the United States from giving full effect to the VCCR,
thus placing the United States in violation of its treaty commitments); LaGrand,
2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 125 (maintaining that the United States must grant review and
reconsideration in a manner of its own choosing); Ray, supra note 13, at 1741
(acknowledging that, in all the past VCCR litigation, courts were reluctant to
provide suppression of evidence as a remedy stemming from an Article 36
violation); Keasler, supra note 11, at 1174 (eschewing suppression as a “vastly
disproportionate remedy” (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2681)).
108. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 450 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court should
radically limit the treaty power and the extent to which it can create federal law).
109. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (discussing
the advantages of stare decisis and the relevant inquiry when deciding whether to
adhere to prior case law, provided that the prior rule of law proves workable).
110. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2692-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(counseling the Court to give effect to a decision that, while not binding in the
instant case, involved very similar facts to a case previously adjudicated by the
ICJ, which has recognized expertise in and authority over the VCCR).
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international tribunal jurisprudence and grant the ICJ, or other
international tribunals, the power to review the narrow issues arising
directly from the treaty over which that tribunal has review power.111
Though the Optional Protocol does allow for ICJ review of
application of the VCCR, that grant does not automatically confer
broad oversight power,112 something the Court, rightfully, seems
extremely fearful of.113
1.

The ICJ Has Authority to Conclusively Rule on Interpretation of
the VCCR Itself

Article 36 calls for countries to inform arrested foreign nationals
“without delay” of their consular rights, creating the need for
implementing measures.114 These implementing measures would
exist even after Congressional implementation of Article 94(1) or a
reversal from the Court on the matter of self-execution. The future
need for this implementation poses the problem, because Article 36
necessarily requires state action—the treaty itself requires a state to
perform a function to accomplish the treaty’s purpose.115
111. See Optional Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1 (providing that states ratifying
the VCCR thereby consent to jurisdiction for “[d]isputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Convention”). Though “application” could be
read as a broad grant of power to review all issues arising under the VCCR,
signing countries of the Optional Protocol would likely not have conceded such
far-reaching power to the ICJ. Id.
112. See Martin Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of
International Tribunals in the United States and France: Reflections on Recent
Practice, 58 ME. L. REV. 406, 406 (2006) (discussing that although domestic
enforcement of treaty obligations is mandatory, the method for that enforcement is
traditionally left up to the state); see also infra notes 141-52 (outlining an analogy
to Erie and discussing the notion that the Optional Protocol conferred some limited
authority to the ICJ).
113. See infra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the United States’
fear that a supranational court could operate as a court of criminal appeals with
final, unreviewable say on important legal issues).
114. See Cyril Emery, Treaty Solutions from the Land Down Under: Reconciling
American Federalism and International Law, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 115, 134
(2005) (explaining that because Article 36 requires officials to notify foreign
nationals of their right to consular assistance, the treaty requires some level of
implementation); see also Reynolds, supra note 75, at 342 (criticizing the absence
of legislation to address the duties of state and federal courts in cases involving
arrested foreign nationals).
115. See Medellín, slip op. at 4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (imposing on the states
the responsibility to uphold American treaty commitments); Emery, supra note
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The conflict between the ICJ and the Supreme Court in SanchezLlamas (but not Medellín, as the Court does not reach the issue of
interpreting the VCCR and thus avoids the conflict altogether) arises
out of a difference in point of view. Since the VCCR requires both
full effect and conformity with local laws and regulations (subject to
the condition that local laws and regulations may not prevent that full
effect), implementing Article 36 rights almost inevitably conflicts, on
some occasions, with a forum state’s laws.116 Depending on the point
of view, one could emphasize the “full effect” clause or the “in
conformity with the laws” of the United States clause.117 United
States rules of procedural default do not, by themselves, contravene
Article 36 of the treaty.118 However, the ICJ does at times “tacitly
disfavor” basic U.S. procedural methods.119
Additionally, Sanchez-Llamas did not address the two aspects of
the ICJ’s decision that constitute the sum total of Avena’s VCCR
analysis: the length of “without delay” and whether an individual
receives a right of action stemming from Article 36 violations.120 The
remainder of Avena discusses application of the VCCR in U.S.
114, at 133 (arguing that in light of recent Supreme Court cases, treaties requiring
state implementation may run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine of New
York v. United States and Printz v. United States).
116. See VCCR, supra note 3, art. 36(2) (subordinating the clause that permits
countries to exercise their obligations in conformity with state laws and regulations
to a separate proviso which mandates that those laws and regulations must enable
full effect).
117. Compare Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 139 (emphasizing that regardless of the
standard due process rights in the United States, the United States must grant
review and reconsideration to VCCR violations), with Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct.
at 2686 (disagreeing with the ICJ interpretation, declaring it swept “too broadly,”
and essentially supplanting the VCCR’s requirement that rights “‘shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving state’”).
118. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 90 (explaining that the problem is not
inherent in the rule of procedural default itself, but only when the rule does not
allow detained individuals the opportunity to challenge a conviction because
officials at no point informed him or her of Article 36 rights).
119. See Ray, supra note 13, at 1748 (commenting on the ICJ’s proposition that
it was immaterial whether a violation of Article 36 actually prejudiced the case, a
finding that a domestic court would normally require prior to the institution of any
remedy).
120. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677 (finding it “unnecessary to resolve
the question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals enforceable rights”
because the petitioners would not be entitled to relief on any of the claims they
raised regardless of the issue of enforceable rights).
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courts.121 Medellín, of course, made these considerations temporarily
moot.
Claiming, as the ICJ has, that it can essentially review domestic
court rulings in light of international law oversteps its mandate.122
However, the Optional Protocol’s grant of authority certainly allows
the ICJ some room for interpretation of the treaty’s provisions.123 The
Optional Protocol’s grant of power to the ICJ, should U.S. courts be
constrained by that grant, confines the ICJ to interpret only
international substantive law; the grant of power does not allow the
ICJ to act as an international court of criminal appeal.124
Avena contained three primary holdings.125 Since two of these
holdings interpret the language, purpose and effect of the VCCR, the
ICJ has authoritative power to adjudicate those issues.126 First, the
ICJ ruled on the meaning of “without delay” in the VCCR.127 The
exact meaning of “without delay” in the VCCR is not defined, so the
121. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶¶ 111-112 (discussing the United States’ rule
of procedural default).
122. See id. ¶ 37 (noting the United States’ objection that the ICJ could
essentially operate as a court of criminal appeal if it found for Mexico). But see
Bulacio Case, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶¶ 116-117 (Sept. 18,
2003) (marking an example of a foreign, international court superseding the
procedural rules of a sovereign nation and preempting the effect of those
procedures). In Bulacio, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights overruled a
national court’s decision to dismiss a criminal trial, on statute of limitation
grounds, brought against authorities who had severely beaten a child. Id. ¶¶ 3(24)(25). The logic of the Inter-American Court bears similarities to the ICJ’s logic in
Avena, that in some cases the nation’s procedural rules did not enable a treaty to
have full effect. See id. ¶¶ 162(4)-(5) (deciding that the state must enforce the
terms of the treaty despite certain procedural bars, just as the ICJ found in Avena
that the United States must enforce the VCCR in spite of the Mexican nationals’
procedural default).
123. See Optional Protocol, supra note 4 (explaining the ICJ’s power to interpret
the VCCR).
124. Compare LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 125 (requiring that the United States
merely adopt some measure of review and reconsideration and thus limiting the
scope of the ICJ’s ruling to merely interpreting the effect of a VCCR term), with
Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶¶ 140-141 (mandating that the judicial branch conduct the
review and reconsideration, and therefore expanding significantly the scope of the
ICJ’s requirement in LaGrand).
125. See Tranel, supra note 20, at 426-28.
126. See Optional Protocol, supra note 4.
127. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 63 (finding that the term “without delay”
means that authorities shall inform a foreign national of his or her rights under the
VCCR as soon as they realize, or should have realized, the prisoner’s citizenship).
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ICJ, charged with interpretation of the treaty under the Optional
Protocol, has authoritative interpretive power.128 Second, the ICJ
reiterated that the VCCR provides an individual cause of action in
the courts of signatory states.129 Again, the ICJ interpreted a term of
the VCCR and reached a conclusion regarding exactly what rights
the treaty conveyed.130 Finally, the ICJ ruled that the United States
must abandon rules of procedural default in order to provide
adequate review and reconsideration.131 This final decision
impermissibly hijacks U.S. procedure,132 and therefore exceeds the
scope of the ICJ’s power.133
2. Although the Supreme Court Has Power to Interpret the
Optional Protocol, It Does Not Have the Power to Interpret, and
Thus Effectively Overrule, an ICJ Opinion Because ICJ Opinions
Are Not Federal Law
If the Supreme Court or Congress takes action to make the
Optional Protocol and VCCR, or other like treaties, federal law under
the Supremacy Clause, the Optional Protocol gives the ICJ binding
authority to interpret the VCCR.134 However, would that imply that
128. See id. ¶ 30 (pronouncing that it is the ICJ’s role to make findings on
“question[s] of interpretation of the obligations imposed by the Vienna
Convention”).
129. See id. ¶ 40 (noting the United States’ continual refusal to recognize an
individual right stemming from the VCCR despite the ICJ’s decision in LaGrand);
see also, LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77 (concluding that the wording of Article
36, stating that a detained foreign national will be informed of “his rights,”
establishes that the drafters of the VCCR intended to create individual rights).
130. See Cancio, supra note 26, at 1071-72 nn.221-22 (noting that this would
not be the first time the Supreme Court has recognized individual rights arising out
of treaties).
131. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (relating the fact that the ICJ
ruled that clemency proceedings instituted by the United States did not meet the
requirements of the review and reconsideration mandated in LaGrand).
132. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2686. But see LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104,
¶ 52 (disagreeing with the United States’ claim that providing a remedy for
Germany’s claim would impermissibly implicate rules of domestic procedure).
133. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (defining the scope of the ICJ as one of
interpretation of treaties at issue and of international law).
134. Compare Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (invoking the famous
Marbury v. Madison to assert the Supreme Court’s power to “say what the law is”
regarding enforceability and interpretation to bolster the point that the Supreme
Court interprets federal law, which includes treaties), with Optional Protocol,
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an ICJ opinion is also federal law, given that the ICJ’s power to
decide cases arises from a federal law itself?135 If ICJ opinions were
federal law, the Supreme Court could reinterpret, or declare
unconstitutional, what the ICJ said in Avena, thus eviscerating any
power the ICJ had.136
The ICJ, on the other hand, claims with an equally strong
argument that the Optional Protocol itself gives it authoritative
power to decide and enforce as binding its interpretations of the
VCCR.137 If the Optional Protocol, or a treaty granting similar
jurisdiction to the ICJ or another international court, becomes federal
law through the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, that treaty’s
drafters could not have intended the Supremacy Clause to totally
subsume the power given to the ICJ. Adopting such a framework
would render any such treaty meaningless.138 Given that under such a
treaty scheme, both courts would have a role to play in adjudicating
questions arising under the VCCR,139 both courts must concede some
ground to maintain the envisioned equilibrium.140
supra note 4, art. 1 (providing the ICJ with jurisdiction over disputes arising out of
the interpretation of the VCCR).
135. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Medellín v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 2129
(2007) (No. 06-984) (questioning whether the Court has the authority to question
an ICJ ruling, or is merely obligated to enforce it).
136. See id. at 20 (implying that the agreement of the United States is to enforce
the judgments of the ICJ and to interpret judgments to clarify ambiguities).
137. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 28 (claiming that since the Optional Protocol
granted jurisdiction to “determine the nature and extent of the obligations
undertaken” in the VCCR, the ICJ necessarily has to examine domestic courts’
compliance with international law).
138. See Optional Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1 (assigning to the ICJ the power
to decide “[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
[VCCR],” a power which the Supreme Court seems to have stripped entirely).
139. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (pointing out that ICJ decisions are
binding only to the parties involved and in respect to their particular case); see also
id. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I will assume that the ICJ’s interpretation does
not bind this Court in this case.”) (emphasis added). The majority in SanchezLlamas reiterates that ICJ decisions are accorded “respectful consideration” and
then subsequently seems to completely ignore every aspect of its holding. See
supra notes 81-82, 92-105 and accompanying text. At the very least, however, the
majority recognizes that current precedent accords at least some weight to ICJ
opinions, even if the ICJ has not decided a case regarding the parties before the
Supreme Court. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683.
140. See Cancio, supra note 26, at 1066 (noting that the United States, in the
Tehran hostage case, became the first country to invoke the binding effect of ICJ
judgments).
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An analogy can be drawn, discussed more fully below, to the
decision in Erie and its interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act.141
In Erie, the Supreme Court decided that the Rules of Decision Act
precluded the Supreme Court from reviewing court made common
law.142 In other words, the Supreme Court interpreted a federal law to
mean that state-made law was unreviewable by any federal court,
including the nation’s highest Court.143 The logic for this lies in the
fact that state courts are better suited to determine their own law than
a federal court would be.144 If Congress elects to implement the
Optional Protocol, or a similar treaty, a faithful interpretation of it
reveals that Congress’ enactment has, in effect, deferred the
interpretation of international law to a supranational adjudicatory
body, namely the ICJ, in certain circumstances.145

141. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (deciding that federal courts must apply all state
law, whether statutorily enacted or judicially derived).
142. See id. at 80 (observing that the courts have invaded too far into the rights
reserved for the states).
143. See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa,
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 875-77 (2007) [hereinafter The Continuing Relevance of Erie]
(discussing how under Swift v. Tyson, a federal court could disregard a state court’s
application of state law, but after Erie, federal general common law ceased to exist
and federal courts had no power to declare “substantive rules of common law
applicable in a [s]tate”).
144. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (stating that no one doubts the right of the federal
courts to assert their own procedure).
145. Compare Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948) (requiring that
state laws, interpreted by Erie to mean the common law in addition to statutory
law, “shall be regarded as rules of decision . . . ” and thus referring federal courts
to judge made state common law), with Optional Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1
(mandating that “[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation . . . of the [VCCR]
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the [ICJ] . . .” and therefore
implicitly requiring that those decisions will be honored in each jurisdiction)
(emphasis added). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE U.S. § 103 cmt. b (1986) (emphasizing the expertise of the ICJ in
international matters, the great weight accorded its opinions, and, perhaps most
importantly, the general absence of “national interest or bias” in ICJ opinions
because of its supranational character).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT AN
INTERNATIONAL ERIE DOCTRINE TO EVALUATE
PURPORTEDLY BINDING DECISIONS BY
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS SUCH AS THE ICJ
Scholars have written about Erie almost ad nauseam, to the point
where it seems difficult to add anything new.146 However, no one has
yet connected the framework used in Erie, binding federal courts to
state common law, to establish a similar framework for international
law.147 This Comment has, in essence, already argued for an
International Erie doctrine to govern analysis of ICJ decisions, and
possibly future international adjudicatory bodies’ decisions that have
presumptively binding authority. Though characterizing the
relational authority of the ICJ vis-à-vis the United States in terms of
an “International Erie” theory may seem radical, in truth, it offers a
method to harmonize current case law in the Supreme Court with the
understanding of international legal scholars.148 This section explores
the Supreme Court’s option of providing a workable framework for
courts to consider future international bodies’ dispositions of cases
by asserting an International Erie doctrine.

146. See The Continuing Relevance of Erie, supra note 143, at 874 (introducing
the concepts of Erie and noting that issues in Erie have been “widely discussed”).
147. See id. at 872 (suggesting that Erie has implications for what courts may do
with international law in a domestic setting, in terms of providing federal question
jurisdiction or authority to overturn state law, but not addressing the issue of
whether foreign courts may have binding effect, through an Erie analogy, to have
authoritative force on customary international law).
148. See id. at 879 (explaining the current understanding of Erie still allows for
the application of federal common law in cases such as Banco Nacional de Cuba,
in which the Court derived its power to apply the act of state doctrine because its
ruling concerned an historically federal sphere: foreign affairs); see also Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 425 (referring to the opinion of then-Professor
Jessup in order to legitimize its federal common law analysis); Susan L.
Karamanian, Briefly Resuscitating the Great Writ: The International Court of
Justice and the U.S. Death Penalty, 69 ALB. L. REV. 745, 747 (2006) (suggesting
that the uproar and controversy over international law in United States courts may
be much ado about nothing); Kevin M. Clermont, Federal Courts, Practice &
Procedure: Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18 (2006) (hypothesizing
that in fact the principles of Erie have given way in the context of international
disputes, which by extension would allow room for clarification of the relation to
Erie in the international context).
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Even post-Medellín, the Supreme Court faces a conflict between
its current holdings and ICJ decisions which will at some point likely
have binding effect on the Supreme Court. The primary holding of
Sanchez-Llamas is that U.S. courts do not need to adapt their
procedure to comply with ICJ decisions.149 Expounding a theory of
International Erie would retain the essential holding of SanchezLlamas while still maintaining room to give effect to what the
Supreme Court can characterize as the essential holding of Avena.
Though the Mexican nationals themselves would likely argue that
the primary holding of the ICJ in Avena was that the United States
may not apply rules of procedural default, the Supreme Court may
instead describe the essential holding as concerning solely an
individual’s right of action under the VCCR and the meaning of
“without delay.”150
Looking at the ICJ decision after announcing the concept of an
International Erie, its application would have been, and still may one
day be, easy. The Supreme Court could simply say that the ICJ
exercises a valid power when it interprets the substantive
international law provisions of a treaty. However, just as in Erie,
federal courts retain the power to employ their own federal rules of
procedure, so both state and federal courts retain the power to
employ local rules of procedure, even in the international context.151
Thus, the Supreme Court may ignore the ICJ’s interpretation of

149. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2687 (holding that procedural default
rules apply with the same force and effect to Article 36 claims as they do to any
other federal-law claims).
150. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 122 (reaffirming that the case before the ICJ
concerns not the guilt or innocence of any of the parties, but rather interpretation of
Article 36 claims). The ICJ notes that its “task is to determine what would be
adequate reparation.” Id. ¶ 121. However, given that any such reparation must be
in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving state, the extent to
which the ICJ can mandate reparations is limited. Id.
151. See John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1087,
1105 (1992) (explaining that while major cases interpreting Erie theoretically
establish a utilitarian method of applying the substantive law and procedural law
distinction, significant uncertainty persists regarding the applicability of various
procedural rules in individual cases).
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proper “review and reconsideration” because that aspect of the
holding infringes on domestic procedural law.152

CONCLUSION
While Medellín threw the role of the treaty in domestic law into
upheaval, even members of the majority recognized the continuing
importance of U.S. international commitments in domestic law.153
Undeniably, the progression of ICJ cases from Breard through
LaGrand and finally to Avena increased the tension between
domestic courts’ interpretation and the ICJ’s interpretation of the
VCCR, and thus the tension between the United States’ international
commitments and domestic enforcement. The International Erie
doctrine explored in this Comment would provide the Court with
workable approach to maintain domestic authority over issues of
international law while still incorporating the binding and valid
interpretation of that law by international tribunals. While, the
Supreme Court avoided resolving this tension in Medellín, thus
leaving the difficult issue for a future Court, the recurring nature of
this issue makes it unlikely that Medellín permanently put the matter
to rest. The Court should consider the International Erie doctrine as a
theory that could finally allow for the settlement of this issue
conclusively.

152. Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (asserting the federal courts’ supreme right over
procedural law, even when bound by the Constitution to apply a different
substantive law).
153. See Medellín, slip op. at 6 (Stevens, J., concurring) (labeling the issue at
stake in Medellín as “the honor of the Nation” and advising Texas to seriously
consider fulfilling American obligations as the ICJ enunciated).

